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Abstract
The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can ex-
tract all the equilibrium payoffs at a given Bayesian Game when the
players’ information is correlated. For this result to hold, the principal
needs to know how informative are the agents’ signals. If the princi-
pal does not know how noisy the signal of a player is, or equivalently,
when the signals available to a player can be ranked in order of infor-
mativeness by Blackwell’s criterion, any informational rents obtained
at the game are left to the players. Conversely, whenever the optimal
mechanism leaves a positive surplus to some player, it is always possi-
ble to interpret the model as if, the principal were uncertain regarding
how noisy is the signal of that player. Finally, although signals may
be highly correlated, Blackwell’s ranking implies that the degree of
informativeness of a player’s signal ought to be independent on the
degree of informativeness of others’ signals.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Can a principal – without observing the agents’ investment in informa-
tion gathering – construct a mechanism that extracts all of the surplus
agents obtain at a given Bayesian game? A key condition for full sur-
plus extraction requires the principal to be certain regarding how noisy
the signal of a player is. When the principal is uncertain regarding
the quality of an agent’s signal, or put it formally, when the signals’
distributions conceivably available to an agent can be ranked in order
of informativeness by Blackwell’s criterion, the principal must leave
to the agent any informational rent obtained at the Bayesian game.
To illustrate, consider an investment bank preparing an initial pub-
lic offering. The typical potential subscribers have correlated infor-
mation regarding the future profitability of the venture. Therefore,
in theory (Crémer and McLean 1988, McAfee and Reny 1992), the
bank should be able to design a selling mechanism that yields the ex-
pected present-value of the venture. Yet, extensive empirical evidence
indicates that initial public offerings are often underpriced1.
Also, consider the regulation of an industry. Although the regu-
lator can induce firms to produce the efficient quantity by resorting
1See Smith (1986).
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to subsidies, social loss occur whenever the subsidies are financed by
distortionary taxes. Although costs are privy to firms, costs in a par-
ticular industry are likely to be correlated. That allows the regulator
to recoup the subsidies. Through benchmarking, that is – by requir-
ing firms to buy licenses with payments coupled to the performance of
competitors, the regulator is able to avoid the shadow cost of public
funds and so, in theory, the social efficient outcome is always imple-
mentable2.
Accounts of why the principal fails to extract all the surplus rely
on risk-aversion and limited liability (Robert 1991), or competition
among sellers (Peters 2001). Another explanation pursued here ar-
gues that the optimal mechanism requires too much knowledge from
the principal. It is rather unrealistic that the amount of effort each po-
tential buyer devotes to gather information would be perfectly known.
As Crémer and McLean (1988, p. 1254) originally pointed,
In ‘nearly all’ auctions the seller should be able to extract the full
surplus, which implies that asymmetry of information between
sellers and buyers should be of no practical importance. Eco-
nomic intuition and informal evidence suggest that this result is
counterfactual, and several explanations can be suggested. First,
2See Faure-Grimaud and Reiche (2001)
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the assumption that a common knowledge probability distribu-
tion exists is very strong.
Consider a simple common-value example in which the object may
be of a low or a high value. Initially, buyers are uninformed but,
previously to the sale, at a monetary cost, buyers can covertly discover
the true value of the object.
If all buyers are uninformed, the second-price auction extracts all
the surplus. In this instance, however, provided the cost of acquir-
ing information is not too high, a buyer should acquire information.
So, when the value is low, the buyer does not participate; when the
value is high, the buyer enjoys a positive surplus. But if all buyers
become informed, the second-price auction again extracts all the sur-
plus. Moreover, since information acquisition costs are sunk, from
the ex-ante point of view, informed buyers do not recoup informa-
tion acquisition costs. As a result, buyers should remain uninformed
to avoid the hold-up problem. In sum, in any equilibrium, buyers
acquire information with positive probability but not with certainty.
At the second-price auction, informed buyers enjoy informational
rents. Nevertheless, since buyers are employing mixed strategies in
equilibrium when acquiring information, from the ex-ante point of
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view, they get zero expected surplus. The seller, however, can not
fully extract the surplus since buyers must be compensated for the
information acquisition costs.
In this paper, the underlying acquisition of information stage is
left unmodelled. As a starting point, it is just posited that the the
informativeness of the players’ signal is not know with certainty. But,
for the reader, it may be useful to keep in mind the above acquisition
of information story. Section 3 presents an example where the moral
hazard stage is modelled and it discusses the results of Obara (2003).
As in McAfee and Reny (1992), this paper is concerned with the
rent extraction problem in a given game Γ. That is, the principal
wants to extract the equilibrium payoffs agents get at Γ. The reason
why the Principal may fail to extract the surplus when agents’ quality
of information is unknown is the following: For simplicity, let’s say
that agents may be either poorly or well informed. In order to extract
the surplus, the principal offers menus of contracts, possibly distinct
menus, to each agent. By choosing a contract from the menu, an agent
gains the right to participate into the game under consideration. Thus,
a contract is simply an entry fee to the game. The monetary transfers
that the contract stipulates are contingent on the contractual choices
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of other agents. Insofar as the choices of the other agents depend on
their private information, from an individual agent’s perspective, a
contract is just a lottery whose payoff is determined by the realization
of the other agents’ types.
A well informed agent can always mimic the contractual choice of
a poorly informed agent without incurring a higher expected entry fee.
An well informed agent can simply add noise to his/her private sig-
nal and then randomize over the equilibrium choices that the poorly
informed would make. As a result, the principal is unable to screen
agents and charge a higher expected entry fee to the well informed. In
the ensuing game, however, the well informed agent is able to lever-
age on the information advantage. The entry fee does not depend the
strategy played during the game, and so, at the game, a well informed
agent can always guarantee to herself a higher payoff than a poorly
informed gets. Consequently, the optimal mechanism must leave in-
formational rents to the well informed agent.
Two conditions are crucial for the above accounting of the existence
of informational rents: One is that information must be valuable at
the game the agents play. Two is that the signals’ distributions avail-
able to an agent can be weekly ranked in order of informativeness by
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Blackwell’s criterion.
The necessity of the first condition should be clear. If information
were to be worthless, the principal would still be able extract all of
the surplus because pooling would not be a problem.
Again, in this short paper, the underlying acquisition of informa-
tion stage is left unmodelled. But, it appears hard to explain why
agents would decide to become informed if information were to be
worthless at games they play.
The second condition is seemly, a non-generic property. If Nature
were to randomly pick the distribution of an agent’s signal, the event
that two feasible distributions would be Blackwell comparable has zero
probability. Although, it might be convenient to model the primitives,
utilities and signals, as exogenously given, it appears somewhat odd to
conceive primitives as being randomly given. Primitives are shaped by
history and, clearly, no endogenously determined ‘primitive’ needs to
be generic. For example, Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) and Berge-
mann and Pesendorfer (2001) present ‘non-generic’, yet endogenously
generated, information structures.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
The full surplus extraction result defies the natural economic intu-
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ition that owners of private information receive informational rents3.
A pivotal assumption for this result requires the distribution of the
signals to be common-knowledge (Crémer and McLean 1988, p. 1254).
Recent research has focusing on easing such knowledge burden.
Bergemann and Morris (2001) study ‘large’ type spaces where a
type is a description of the player’s payoff-relevant characteristics and
his belief regarding the other players’ types. ‘Large’ in that context
means that there are types with identical payoff characteristics but
holding distinct beliefs. Also, Amarante (2001) examines ‘large’ type
spaces where the seller is restricted to ‘simple’ mechanisms. In con-
trast, Neeman (1999) looks at type spaces where a player may have
many types with identical beliefs but with different payoff-relevant
characteristics. Neeman’s work is closely related to the this paper, in
section 4, the contrasts and similarities of his model with our model
are discussed.
3Additional criticism is addressed not to the full surplus extraction result per se but
rather to the mechanism that implements it. The optimal mechanism is sensitive to
changes in fine details of the model. As a result, many papers have analyzed robust
mechanisms. Few examples are: McAfee, McMillan, and Reny (1989), ?, Lopomo (1998,
2001), Amarante (2001) and Bergemann & Morris (2001).
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3. RENT EXTRACTION IN A NUTSHELL
This section introduces most of the notation used in the rest of
the paper, and revisits the results of Crémer and McLean (1988) and
McAfee and Reny (1992), henceforth C&M–M&R.
Consider a finite Bayesian game Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (Ti)i∈N , (pi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N )
where, N is the set of players, and for each player i ∈ N : Ci is the set
of possible actions, Ti is the set of types, pi is the belief over the types
of other players (conditional on i’s own type), and ui is the payoff
function.
Let σ be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of Γ, and uσi = (ui(σ|ti))ti∈Ti
be the corresponding vector of interim equilibrium payoffs of player i.
The principal problem is to design a mechanism to extract the
rents of i. Formally, the rent extraction problem is to find a finite












subject to the participation constraints,




fki (t−i)qi(t−i|ti) ≤ uσi (ti).
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The basic idea is exactly as in C&M–M&R: The principal offers
the menu of stochastic entry fees to player i. By picking an entry fee
from the menu, player i is allowed to play the game Γ. The expected
payments stipulated by an entry fee do not depend upon the action
she chooses to play later on in the game. Hence, conditional on her
type, she must select the entry fee with the lowest expected payment,
provided that the payment does not exceed her equilibrium payoff.
C&M–M&R identify a property of information structures that is
necessary and sufficient for the full extraction of the surplus for any
possible payoff structure. The condition requires that, for any player,
there are no types whose beliefs, about the types of other players, are
a convex combination of beliefs of other types of him/herself.
Theorem 1 Crémer & McLean (1988) The optimal mechanism
yields full surplus extraction for any uσi if and only if ∀ ti ∈ Ti, @




λτ pi (t−i|τ) , ∀ t−i ∈ T−i. (C1)
When the beliefs of a type are not a convex combination of the
beliefs of other types, there is a hyperplane that separates the be-
liefs of this type from the beliefs of other types. In other words,
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> 0 for all τi 6= ti. The inner product of the entry fee
with the beliefs of a give type is just the expected payment that this





ti∈Ti , the principal is able to induce the players to
reveal their beliefs. A type who chooses an entry fee intended to an-
other type incurs positive payments but, no payments are incurred by
choosing the entry fee tailored to one’s own type. In the language of
Neeman (1999), it is possible to extract the players’ beliefs.
In order to extract the players’ surpluses, the principal simply
constructs another menu of any fees:
{
f tii = u
σ





type that chooses the entry fee f tii pays the interim equilibrium payoffs
of type ti with certainty and, in addition, pays the expected penalties
of misreporting, which are zero if no misreporting occurs but otherwise
can be made arbitrarily large by increasing ωi.
5. AN EXAMPLE
The example presented here is a static version of a multi-period
Baron-Myerson model of procurement studied by Faure-Grimaud and
Reiche (2001). Two firms, have to produce a quantity q of consump-
tion good. Firm 2 produces q units of an intermediate good which
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are then are used by firm 1 to produce q units of a final good.Firm
i ∈ {1, 2} has a constant average total cost ci and so the total cost of
producing q units of the final good is (c1 + c2) q. The consumers’ sur-
plus generated by the production of q units is S(q) where S satisfies the
following properties: S′ > 0 , S′′ < 0, S′(0) = +∞ and S′(+∞) = 0 .
The marginal cost ci of firm i takes values in {cl, ch} where ch > cl.
The actual value of the marginal cost is proprietary information of the
firm. The joint probability distribution of the marginal costs – p =
(p rs) where r, s ∈ {l, h}, is common-knowledge among the regulator
and the firms.
The regulatory agency offers contracts to the firms that specify a
monetary transfer to each firm as well as a quantity to be produced,
(m, q): mirs is the monetary transfer that firm i gets when it reports
marginal cost cr and the other firm reports marginal cost cs. The
contracted quantity contingent on the reports is defined analogously.
The goal of the regulatory agency is find a menu of contracts in
order to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus





S(qrs)− (1 + λ)(m1rs + m2sr) + m1rs − c1rq1rs + m2sr − c2sq2sr
)
The efficient level of production equates the marginal benefit with
13
the marginal social cost of production, S′(qrs) = (1+λ)(cr+cs), where
λ is the shadow cost of public funds. In this setting, the optimal
mechanism implements the social efficient outcome.
Consider a modification of the above scenario. Prior to accept-
ing the contract offered by the regulator and observing its current
marginal cost, firm 1 may have an opportunity to covertly invest in a
cost-saving technology. More specifically, investing k shifts down the
firm 1’s marginal cost by d. The principal and the firm 2 are uncertain
weather that firm 1 invested or not, let’s say that σ is the belief they
attach to the probability investment occurred.
Capital letters are used to denote the types of the firm 1 that
invested.
In this scenario is trivial to Blackwell-rank signals of firm 1. Re-
gardless weather it invested or not, its beliefs regarding the costs of
firm 2 remain unchanged. As a result, any firm 1 type that invested
can always pool with the respective firm 1 type who did not invest.
Pooling with other types, however, is not feasible since the principal
can extract beliefs at zero cost. In sum, the only incentive compatible
constrains relevant are regarding reporting investment or not invest-
ment. Furthermore, by investing, firm 1 obtains a higher return since
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it has lower costs.
As in the usual mechanism design setting, the individual rationality
constrain binds at the ‘bottom’, the downward incentive compatible
constraints are bidding, and there is no distortion at the ‘top’. More
precisely, if investment occurs, the principal sets an efficient quantity:
qRs = S′ −1((1+λ)(cr+cs−d)). Otherwise, the quantities are distorted:
qrs = S′ −1((1 + λ) (cr + cs +
σ
1− σd)).
Finally, in order for an equilibrium in mixed strategy to exist, the





prs qrs = k ,
and the assumptions regarding S guarantee that there is σ ∈ (0, 1)
that satisfies this condition for k sufficient low.
The above story fits precisely the theoretical model of Neeman
(1999) where, the key condition, for the failure of the full surplus
extraction in an auction, was the existence of an agent with two types
who share identical beliefs but differ in their valuations. This paper
shows that identical beliefs are sufficient but not necessary for pooling
– different degrees of informativeness will do as well as in allowing
agents to pool. In the story above, as again in Neeman, the difference
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in cost/valuations was crucial for the result. In this paper, that role
is played by condition 4 that guarantees that a player gets a strictly
higher expected payoff when being well informed than when being
poorly informed. That is, information is valuable at the game Γ.
Notice that in the above game the principal is not allowed to com-
mit to a mechanism before agents decide to invest or not. The results
would change if one allowed for that. Obara (2003) considers a general
model where: the principal commits to a mechanism; agents take hid-
den actions that affect their utilities and/or signals; agents privately
observe the realization of their mixed strategies and the realization
of their signals; agents report their private information to the princi-
pal; and finally, the principal implements the allocation and monetary
transfers dictated by the mechanism. A main result is that the ability
to commit to a mechanism prior to the moral hazard stage allows the
principal to eliminate the uncertainty and henceforth, the full surplus
extraction outcome is implementable.
Under the light of Obara (2003)’s results, one may tempted to at-
tribute the existence of informational rents to an ad-hoc restriction
imposed on the mechanism, namely the principal’s lack of ability to
commit. That misses that the main point of this paper that is un-
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likely that the principal would know all information necessary to fully
extract the agents’ surplus, still holds even if the mechanism is aug-
mented. More exactly, in order to design a grand mechanism, as in
Obara (2003), the principal must know the cost of acquiring informa-
tion; the principal must know which the set of signals is available to
the agents. If there is uncertainty regarding costs of acquiring infor-
mation or, regarding which sets of signals’ are available to the agents,
the full surplus extraction result breaks down again. It is equally true,
however, that if the uncertainty is created by moral hazard, by allow-
ing the principal to design a larger mechanism, its possible to restore
the result. But, clearly, once more, it is always possible, to consider
an additional layer of uncertainty.
4. SIGNAL INFORMATIVENESS
In most applications, a type is simply the realization of a sin-
gle dimensional signal. To contemplate the fact that signals vary in
their informativeness/quality, this identification is no longer useful.
Henceforth, the type of a player shall be a description of both: the
probability distribution from where the player’s signal is drawn from
– the informativeness of the player’s signal, and also the particular
extraction, or realization, of that signal.
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From the point of view of the principal, the informativeness of
an agent’s information is not known with certainty, possibly, due to
covert acquisition of information. Here, not as in Bergemann and
Pesendorfer (2001), the principal is not able to control the buyers’
acquisition of information, nor choose their information structures,
otherwise, it would be trivial to fully extract the surplus.
In this paper, however, the underlying model of acquisition of infor-
mation is left unmodelled. For simplicity, player i has at her disposal
only two signals; put simply, with positive probability, her signal is
either Xθ or Xη.
Signals are ranked in order of informativeness by Blackwell’s cri-
terion 4: signal Xθ is said to be more informative, about the others
players’ types t−i, than signal Xη is, if and only if, there are scalars
β(x,y) ≥ 0 such that, for all y realizations of Xη and all t−i ∈ T−i,
p (ti = (y, η)|t−i)





p (ti = (x, θ)|t−i)
p (ti2 = θ)
, (C2)




This definition says that signal Xη is a garbling of Xθ. Intuitively,
Xη is a further randomization over the possible outcomes of Xθ, with
4See Crémer (1982) for a clear exposition of Blackwell’s Theorem.
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the β(x,y) being the weights employed by this ‘randomization’ as de-
picted in the figure below.
β42
η











Figure 1: Xη is obtained by adding ‘noise’ to Xθ
The next proposition establishes that equivalence of the Blackwell’s
ranking of signals and the Crémer & McLean’s condition (C1).
Proposition 2 The equality in (C1) holds if and only if, it is possible
to write the set of types of player i as Ti = {x1, . . . , xni} × {θ, η} and
find signals’ Xθi and X
η
i such that: 1) The distribution of types can be
expressed as p(ti, t−i) = Pr
(
Xti2i = ti1, t−i
)
Pr(ti2) and 2) The signal
Xθi is sufficient for the signal X
η
i regarding t−i.
Proof. First, we prove that if Xθi is sufficient for the signal X
η
i
and the type space of i is Ti = {x1, . . . , xni}×{θ, η} then, the equality
in (C1) must hold.
Let λ(x,y) = β(x,y)
p (ti = (x, θ))
p (ti = (y, η))
where β(x,y) are the coefficients
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implied by Blackwell’s ranking (C2). Bayes’ rule implies that,




p(ti = (y, η))









p (ti = (x, θ)|t−i)








p (t−i|ti = (x, θ))
p (ti2 = θ)







p (ti = (x, θ))
p(ti = (y, η))
p (t−i|ti = (x, θ))






p (t−i|ti = (x, θ))
p (ti2 = θ)
,
which is precisely the equality in (C1).
To prove the converse, consider Ti, a subset of Ti that is maximal
with respect the property that the beliefs about t−i of any type ti ∈ Ti
cannot be expressed as a convex combination of beliefs of types in the
complementary set Ti\Ti. For finite Ti, the set Ti can be obtained by
a constructive proof. In the case that the type space of i is infinite,
Zorn’s Lemma is needed to prove the existent of Ti.
By construction, the beliefs of any type in the complementary set
can be expressed as a convex combination of beliefs of types in Ti. To
construct the more informative signal, Xθi , set Pr(ti2 = θ) = Pr (Ti)
and Pr
(






0 if ti 6∈Ti
p(ti, t−i)
Pr (Ti) ti ∈ Ti
. The construction of the




sufficient for Xηi , we just use Baye’s rule in the equation given by (C1)
to obtain Blackwell’s condition.
Observe that the proof of proposition above can be easily adapted
for the case of continuous distributions, as the common-value example
given below shows.
Example 1 As Kagel and Levin (1999), the signals belong to a family
of uniform distributions parameterized by ε, more exactly
Xε|V ∼ U[V − ε, V + ε].
Since, f2ε(y|ν) = 12fε(x1|ν) + 12fε(x2|ν) where x1 = y − ε and x2 =
y + ε, it can be easily checked that Xε is more informative than X2ε.
Also notice that, since the probability of the type factors into the
product of the probability of the degree of informativeness and the re-
alization of the signal, Blackwell’s ordering implies the informativeness
of a player’s signal must be independent of the others’ informativeness.
Corollary 3 If player i signal may be either Xη or Xθ with positive
probability and signal Xθ is more informative than Xη then full surplus
extraction for any uσi is not possible.
5. INFORMATIONAL RENTS
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It is important to emphasize that the definitions of well or poorly
informed buyers refers to the state of buyers before they learn the
realization of their signals. As a result, the informed buyers’ payoff
refers to the expected payoff of buyers who have a more informative
signal. Information rents exist when a well informed buyer expected
payoff is higher than the payoff she would obtain in the case she were
poorly informed. It does not make sense to measure information rents
by ex-post payoffs. For instance, a poorly informed high signal type
may get a higher payoff than a well informed low signal type.
When condition C2 of Proposition 3 holds, full extraction is not
achievable for arbitrary equilibrium payoffs. But, equilibrium payoffs
are not arbitrary, they depend on the information structure. One
should ask, what restrictions C2 imposes on the equilibrium payoffs?
Condition C2 implies that the expected the payoff of player i must
satisfy:
ui(c|ti = (y, η)) =
∑
x∈ supp Xθ
λ(x,y) ui(c|ti = (x, θ)), ∀c ∈ C.
Summing over t−i in C1 gives
∑
x λ(x,y) = 1, which says that the payoff
of any poorly informed type is an average of the payoff of some well
informed types. Thus, any equilibrium payoff profile must satisfy: for
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all y ∈ supp Xη,










The condition below is quite natural, it just says information is
valuable at the game Γ.
Condition 4 There exists at least one poorly informed type y, such
that C3 holds as a strictly inequality.
The corollary below establishes the existence of informational rents.
Corollary 5 Assume 4 and also that no type is excluded by the opti-
mal mechanism, then player i obtains a higher expected surplus at the





ti∈Ti be an optimal entry fee schedule. Consider
the following alternative strategy: each well-informed type (x, θ), in-
stead of choosing the fee f (x,θ)i designated to her own type, chooses,
with probability β(x,y), a fee intended for a poorly informed type (y, η)
where β(x,y) is the weight given by C2. This strategy guarantees that,
the expected entry fee of the well-informed buyer θ is equal to the one
that the poor-informed buyer η incurs. In the following game, how-
ever, C3 and condition 4 assure that the well-informed buyer obtains
a strictly higher surplus. ¥
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper tells a natural story for the existence of informational
rents under the optimal mechanism. It also suggest an interpretation
on the role of independence. Remember that the informativeness of
a player’s signal must be independent of the others’ informativeness.
Otherwise, it would be impossible to order signals of a given player by
informativeness. In other words, independence, of informativeness, is
built into Blackwell’s ranking. This remark corroborates the view that
informational rentals are a product of independent signals but, Black-
well’s ranking, or independence of informativeness, is far from being
an arbitrary presumption. If players decide how much information
to acquire, the signals’ informativeness ought to be independent as a
consequence of Nash play. Instead of viewing independence a ‘knife-
edge’ property, it is possible to interpret it just as a convenient way
of writing a continuation game, without need to specify the previous
history.
The two-dimensional type space considered in this model is obvi-
ously very parsimonious. It was the simplest short-cut to point that
uncertainty over the quality of the agents’ information matters. But,
it is still unrealistic to presume that the principal, or the other agents,
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would know which set of possible signals’ distributions is available to
the agent. Or even which is the set of available sets of possible signals’
distributions. To describe a more realistic environment, a richer lan-
guage as employed by Epstein and Peters (1999) or Bergemann and
Morris (2001) is required.
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